| The
Battle of Midway June 3 - 6, 1942 |
READER CONTRIBUTIONS BATTLE OF MIDWAY MODELS: BY JOHN TATE |
LCDR John S. Thach's
Grumman F4F-4 "Wildcat"
Commander, Fighting Three
By John Tate
This Tamiya 1/48th scale Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat has been built to depict the plane flown by LCDR John S. "Jimmy" Thach while flying a strike escort mission on June 4, 1942. Thach, flying F-23 (BuNo 5093), along with five other F4F-4s from Fighting Three, was escorting Yorktown's strike against the Kido Butai, consisting of 17 SBD-3s of Bombing Three (led by LCDR Maxwell F. Leslie) and 12 TBD-1s from Torpedo Three (led by LCDR Lance E. "Lem" Massey).
After Enterprise and Hornet strikes departed for the two known Japanese carriers shortly after 0800, RADM Frank J. Fletcher, Commander of Task Force 17, thought about his next move. Having sent his entire attack force after one carrier at Coral Sea, only to have two more pop up soon after, had made an impression on Fletcher. Not one to fall into the same trap twice, Fletcher intended to keep Yorktown as a reserve in case the other two carriers reported by US Naval Intelligence suddenly appeared. Conferring with CAPT Elliot C. Buckmaster, CO of Yorktown, CDR Murr Arnold, Yorktown's Air Officer, and LCDR Oscar Pederson, Commander, Yorktown Air Group (CYAG) at around 0820, however, Fletcher decided to send part of his air group to attack Kido Butai. There were several reasons for Fletcher's change of heart. Having monitored the fighter director circuit, Fletcher knew that Japanese aircraft had spotted Task Force 16. This, combined with his desire to make sure his strike group was not caught on deck, led to the decision to send the 35 plane strike. He held back LT Wallace C. Short's "Scouting Five" in order to launch a second strike or provided reconnaissance.
Thach was very upset when he heard that he would only be allowed six fighters on his escort mission. It had been worked out previous to the battle that Thach would have eight F4Fs to fly top cover for Torpedo Three. Since his new "beam defense position" required multiples of four planes, six would not work. However, CDR Arnold told Thach that the orders came from above and he would have to make due with what he was given.
Thach had the additional problem of trying to quickly train some of his men in the basics of his new tactic, later coined the "Thach Weave." Since Fighting Three had added several pilots from Fighting Forty-Two, many of the men with whom Thach would be flying did not know the "Weave." Therefore, Thach instructed MACH Tom F. Cheek, with his wingman ENS Daniel C. Sheedy, fly "close escort" for Torpedo Three, while Thach would lead first divisions first and second sections, a few thousand feet above the TBD's as "high escort."
VF-3 Tactical Organization
Strike Escort Mission, 4 June 1942
Tactical Unit |
Type |
Bu # |
Side # |
Pilot |
Notes |
| 1st Division | . | . | . | . | . |
| 1st Section | F4F-4 | #5093 | F-23 | LCDR J. S. Thach | Shot down 3 A6M2 "Zeros" |
| . | F4F-4 | #5049 | F-20 | ENS R. A. M. Dibb | Shot down 1 A6M2 "Zero" |
| 2nd Section | F4F-4 | #5165 | F-6 | LT(jg) B. R. Macomber | Damaged 1 A6M2 "Zero" |
| . | F4F-4 | #5150 | F-9 | ENS E. R. Bassett (MIA) | Shot down by Japanese CAP |
| 3rd Section | F4F-4 | #5143 | F-16 | MACH T. F. Cheek | Shot
down 1 A6M2 "Zero" Damaged 1 A6M2 "Zero" |
| . | F4F-4 | #5239 | F-24 | ENS D. C. Sheedy (WIA) | Shot
down 1 A6M2 "Zero" Crash-landed on Hornet |
Yorktown turned into the wind to begin launching 0840. Due to their experience in combat, Yorktown followed a different launch procedure than the normal "Deferred Departure" used by Enterprise and Hornet. Instead, she first launched VT-3s TBD, which immediately set out for the Japanese. Next came Leslie's Bombing 3, ordered to orbit for 12 minutes after the TBDs departed. Finally, about 0905, Thach and his men took off. This "running rendezvous" would save gas and take advantage of the varied cruising speeds of the planes involved.
About 0945, with Leslie overhead at 15,000 feet, Fighting Three caught sight of their escort, flying at 1,500 feet. According to plan, Cheek led his section astern and 1,000 feet above VT-3, with Thach's two sections remaining at 5,500 feet. Both groups of fighters had to make S-turns above the slower torpedo planes in order to keep station.
Since both pilots of Thach's second section were from VF-42 and did not know the "beam defense" position, Thach flew in a standard cruising formation. Luckily for Thach, his wingman, ENS "Ram" Dibb did.
At around 1000, VT-3 caught sight of Kido Butai, and Massey led his charges up to 2,600 feet so as to initiate a high-level approach, with Cheek climbing to maintain his altitude advantage. The TBDs were spotted at 1010 by the Japanese cruiser Chikuma, which fired her main guns to point out the attackers to the Combat Air Patrol, when they were about 15 miles from the nearest carrier. At this time the Japanese CAP consisted of 35 Zeros- 14 close to the carriers (two from Akagi and 12 from Kaga), with three additional fighters being readied on Hiryu and Soryu. Eight Zeros from Akagi Fighter Unit were chasing the remnants of Torpedo Six, while 10 others were off to the southeast (four from Hiryu, and three each from Kaga and Soryu) and three had just been launched from Soryu. Thach was faced with the task of defending 29 strike planes against 41 Zeros with only 6 F4Fs. Very long odds indeed! (Credit this particular paragraph specifically to JL First Team).
Several of the A6Ms went after Thach and his four escorts, while still others hit Torpedo Three and Cheek's section. However, Leslie's Bombing Three went un-sighted and un-attached. Additionally, this new attack allowed the shattered remnants of Torpedo Six to withdraw, allowing four TBDs to return to Enterprise. Without firing a single shot, Yorktown's attack had made a big contribution to the victory at Midway.
The initial intercept appeared from the smoke of Chikuma's burst. Bad luck beset upon Thach several Zeros that had been attacking VT-6. So many, in fact, that Thach commented that they had to line up so as to take turns making runs from above and behind. However, the first shots would be fired by two different Zeros, probably from Akagi, approaching from below and behind. The leader of this small shotai hit Edgar Bassett's plane, the last in the little formation, and immediately shot him down. Very quickly, the first Zero of the long string above Thach made a run on the new "tail-end Charlie," Macomber. Macomber may have owed his life to the fact that Torpedo Six had just completed its attack, for F-6 was hit with several 7.7 mm rounds but no 20 mm cannon shells.
Having been hit twice in moments, Thach quickly led his men lower and faster towards Torpedo Three. However, quickly realizing his plight, at around 3,000 feet he slipped his three remaining planes into a line astern- Thach, Dibb and Macomber. Outnumbered about six-to-one, Thach was in no position to use the Grumman's weight to dive away. He also new that if the three fighters split up, it would only be a matter of time before disaster befell them. Under the circumstances, the only thing to do was stay together and fight it out.
The Zeros were making individual attacks from behind and above, using high speed hit-and-run tactics. With these runs occurring every 30 seconds or so, Thach was under constant attack. His first series of countermoves was to turn hard away from the Zero once it had committed to a firing pass. This meant the Japanese pilot would have a very difficult full-deflection shot, which was made even more difficult due to the fact that the Zero would often not be able to gain the necessary lead because of his speed. Macomber was repeatedly the target of these coordinated attacks, and he and Dibb faithfully followed Thach during every countermove.
Thach had wanted to radio Macomber and have him split out, as leader of the second section, to initiate the "beam defense position." However, the initial attack by Zeros destroyed Macomber's radio. Additionally, having previously been with Fighting Forty-Two, Macomber knew nothing of the new tactics. After first unsuccessfully attempting to loosen the line astern, Thach scored his first of three victories. Frustrated by the lack of being able to shoot back, Thach continued to turn away from the attacking Zeros. However, by swiftly reversing his turn, Thach was often able to make long range snap shots at the attackers as they climbed away. During one such move, a Zero apparently tried to pull out too quickly and lost all its speed, giving Thach a close range low deflection shot. The Japanese fighter stalled and crashed into the Pacific below.
After this kill, Thach decided to send his wingman, Dibb, out into a position several hundred yards abeam, as if he was leading a section. Flying even with Thach, Dibb became the target of the next Zero to attack. At Kaneohe, Thach told his men to use the radio to initiate the "weave," since not all the pilots new the lookout doctrine. So radioing Thach, Dibb did as his skipper instructed and made a sharp turn to the left, with Thach and Macomber turning right to set up a scissors. The Japanese pilot was aggressive and stuck on Dibb's tail. Thach slide just underneath Dibb, setting up a head-on shot on the Zero from slightly below. Thach held his fire as long as he dared, hitting the Zero and setting it aflame. Thach has scored his second kill and the first using the "Thach Weave."
Having the Zero shot off his tail, Dibb re-closed on Thach several times before he realized he was to stay abreast. Macomber, thinking that Dibb was breaking formation, initially split the difference between Thach and Dibb before closing up on Thach's wing. After the initial encounter, Thach and Dibb were able to use the lookout doctrine- looking above and behind the opposite section, turning towards it when a Zero attacked, signaling the other section to set up the scissors.
Following the first weave, the Zeros most often did not follow through. One Zero tried to recover to abruptly after starting a run on Dibb and Thach shot him down- his third kill of the day. Dibb shot down one plane off Thach and Macomber, while Macomber only had one shot, a long range shot on which he claimed a probable.
In spite of the fact that Thach and his men were totally out numbered, at the loss of one Wildcat early, he and his men shot down four Japanese fighters and damaged one. The close escort of Tom Cheek and Dan Sheedy each shot down on additional A6M, with Sheedy being wounded and later crash-landing on Hornet. The work of Fighting Three meant that during the initial intercept only one TBD was shot down. There were simply too many fighters, though, and 10 of 12 TBDs were shot down outright during their attack on Hiryu, with two others ditching near Task Force 16 and 17.
Starting around 1022, Thach, who had been keeping an eye on the Japanese ships during the fight, watched three squadrons of SBDs, including Bombing Three, fatally hit three carriers. When the Japanese fighters noticed this, the attacks on the three Wildcats ended at about 1030. As much as the six minutes of US dive bombing changed the course of the war, so did Thach's twenty-minute engagement signal an end to the myth of the "Invincible Zero." Outnumbered perhaps as much as seven-to-one, his two sections of four planes had a victory ratio of four-to-one, and his division of six an impressive six-to-one.
Thach led his three F4Fs back to Yorktown while Cheek and Sheedy headed back individually. Thach sighted her about 1130 and began to circle, waiting for Yorktown's flight deck to clear. During his orbit, Thach was joined by Tom Cheek. Thach landed first, his F-23 leaking oil into the cockpit, followed by Dibb and Macomber. Cheek landed last, ending up upside down on the flight deck. ENS Sheedy, wounded and in a damaged fighter, crash landed on Hornet.
F-23 was damaged enough so that it would not fly again. Japanese dive bombers from Hiryu would score three hits on Yorktown. Thach would later fly in F-1 (BuNo 5174) and score one more kill, this time a B5N "Kate", probably flown by LT Joichi Tomonaga, hikotaicho (air group officer) and commander of Hiryu Air Group, and another B5N damaged. However, Yorktown was hit by two torpedoes which led to her abandonment. Hit by two more torpedoes from I.168 on June 6, she would sink on June 7, taking with her F-23.
NOTES
Account of the Flight
The account above is largely based upon the excellent work of John B. Lundstrom's The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. For a more detailed account of this action, read this outstanding book.